tribes. ' " 7 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock," the United States Supreme Court described the preeminent power of Congress in Indian matters in a land cessation case involving the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes. The Court held that Congress has "plenary authority" over tribal relations not subject to control by the judicial department. 9 This broad rule has been eroded in modern cases which give at least a limited role to the Court. 1 0 An example is Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," a case which involved a suit by an Indian against her own tribe in a dispute over a tribal ordinance. The Supreme Court established a modern balance of power when it held that Congress' authority over Indian issues is "extraordinarily broad," and the Court's role is "correspondingly restrained.
'
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With the dominant role held by Congress and increasing involvement by the Court, the authority of the federal government over Indian tribes has varied in manner from deferential to paternal. The deferential approach is illustrated in United States v. Wheeler, 3 a collateral estoppel case involving a tribal court criminal judgment and a subsequent federal district court indictment arising out of the same incident. The Supreme Court held that "until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers."' 4 In other cases, however, the deferential attitude shifts to a more restrictive, prejudicial approach. The Court in Oliphant 5 defined tribal power negatively and more narrowly when it held that Indian tribes "are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with [Indian tribe] status."" 1 6
B. Major and Minor Crimes
The legal authority of American Indian tribes described in Wheeler often is referred to as "quasi sovereign.' 7 That concept is illustrated in the area of tribal criminal jurisdiction on reservation land. For the 1 a non-Indian murdered another nonIndian on a Utah reservation. The Court held that the state of Colorado had jurisdiction over its "own citizens and other white persons" even with crimes committed on the Ute Reservation.
24 Therefore, the tribe was denied jurisdiction and the accused was tried in the state court.
25
For minor crimes committed on Indian land, jurisdiction also depends on whether the alleged criminal is Indian or non-Indian. For those crimes committed by Indians, tribal courts have jurisdiction over the accused. The federal Crime and Criminal Procedure Act provides that courts of the United States do not have jurisdiction over "any offense in the Indian Country [which] The Court's final justification was that tribal jurisdiction was 'inconsistent with their status."''0 As evidence of the Indians' subordinate status, the Court noted that tribes were under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and had lost the power to sell their property to foreign nations. 41 Therefore, the Indian tribes had given up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States. According to the majority, a principle obvious a century ago "should be no less obvious today."
,42
IfL The Competing Forces of Indian Jurisdiction of Non-Indian Minor Crimes on Indian Land
A. Indian Subordination
The conquest and subsequent subordination of American Indians, the uneven development of the tribal judicial system, and problems of non-Indian crime on reservations are three competing forces that shape the issue of tribal courts' criminal jurisdiction. The first of these forces is the historic racial subordination and the peculiar legal status of American Indian tribes. The Supreme Court speaks of the Indian tribes as "distinct independent political communities ' 4 and "quasi sovereigns." 44 However, this elevated language fails to accurately characterize the American Indian-United States relationship. An attitude of dominance and superiority marks much of the United States' associations with the Indian tribes. Moreover, that prejudice has reached the force of law in Supreme Court decisions in Indian cases. The principal Indian doctrine of the United States was outlined in a trilogy of early nineteenth-century cases written by Justice Marshall. In the first of these, Johnson v. McIntosh, 4 5 a case that denied the right of Indian tribes to sell their tribal lands to foreign nations, Marshall articulated the doctrine of discovery and conquest. Noting that most European nations approved of the discovery doctrine, Marshall held that ultimate title to United States territory was acquired by conquest subject only to the "Indian title of occupancy. '46 Consequently, as a colonial power the United States, not Indian tribes, had the exclusive right as the discoverer to transfer title to reservation lands. 4 7 Not only did the conquerors have exclusive power by discovery but the only limit to that control was self-imposed. 48 In order to ensure that the conquering nation would exercise self-control, Marshall held that Indians should not be "wantonly oppressed." 49 An example of the Supreme Court's attempt to avoid oppressing the conquered tribes was in Worcester v. Georgia."' In this case, Marshall spoke of the quasi-sovereignty of Indian tribes, a notion that tribes retained their "original natural rights, as undisputed possessors of the soil. ' 5 Therefore, the state of Georgia had no authority to prevent missionaries from entering Cherokee land because only the federal government, not the state, could limit the rights of the tribe. The result of Worcester is that tribes have the power of sovereigns free of state control subject only to the federal government.
The final concept of the Marshall trilogy is the resulting guardianward relationship between the United States and the American Indian. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 2 where the state of Georgia enacted statutes nullifying all laws, ordinances, and regulations of the Cherokee tribe, Marshall again spoke for the Supreme Court. The Court held that since the tribes "look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father," the relationship of the federal government to the Indians was that of a "ward to his guardian. ' https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/13
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The Marshall trilogy set the foundation for United States-American Indian relations, and the policy of quasi-sovereignty has survived in the most recent Supreme Court cases." That policy has led at least one commentator to contend that, on the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, "friacism is not present here -Indian tribes are political, not race-based, entities." 56 Indeed, in the abstract, the Supreme Court can be viewed as a judicial "great father" protecting the wants of its ward. The Marshall theories, however, cannot be understood fully without looking at the attitudes of the conquering country toward the race of the conquered tribes.
Examples of racial categorization coupled with manipulative and heavy-handed control fill the writings of the early nineteenth century. For example, in 1803 President Jefferson, one of the great fathers of the United States, detailed a plan to acquire land from American Indians. In order to quickly purchase territory for white expansion, the government was to set up trading houses to sell goods to Indians. 7 Jefferson noted that "influential individuals among [the Indians] run in debt, [and] we observe that when the debts get beyond what the individuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands." 8 Jefferson acknowledged that this would eventually lead to the termination of the Indians' history, but "they must see we have only to shut our hand to crush them, and that all our liberalities to them proceed from motives of pure humanity only." In 1848, William Medill, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, expressed an even more conscious attitude of supremacy when he compared Indians to the white "superior race." 6 He reported that Indians were inveterately wedded to "savage habits." ' 6 ' Moreover, it was Medill's opinion that, except in rare instances, an Indian could be brought no "farther within the pale of civilization than to adopt its vices [,] under the corrupting influences of which, too indolent to labor, and too weak to resist, he soon sinks into misery and despair." ' 6 2 In the late nineteenth century, white superiority and Indian subordination were still official public policy. 66 the Supreme Court denied an Indian who had disassociated himself from his tribe the right to vote in federal elections. The Court noted that the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed suffrage should not be denied "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 67 However, the Court did not enfranchise John Elk because he had not in any way been "recognized or treated as a citizen" for the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.
8
To see the doctrine of discovery and the corollary principle of semisovereign status for Indian tribes absent a historic context is to miss the reality of United States' subordination of its native people. Indeed, the abstract principles of conquest and dependent nation status preserve in United States law "the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-Western peoples." ' 6 9 Despite Marshall's vision for the American Indian, it was the Supreme Court in 1901 that spoke most realistically of the sovereignty of Indian tribes. Justice Brown held that "the word 'nation' as applied to the uncivilized Indians is so much of a misnomer as to be little more than a compliment."
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B. An Undeveloped Indian Criminal Justice System
Another of the competing forces in determining American Indian criminal jurisdiction is the wide variation in quality of tribal courts. As the Court in Oliphant noted, there is a dearth of settled Indian law and competent courts.
7 ' Indeed, tribal courts vary from dispute resolvers enforcing "unwritten tribal rules and customs" to modern tribal courts governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act 72 and federal regulations concerning the appointment and qualifications of tribal court judges. The Court acknowledged that "some Indian tribal court 63 However, even with these improvements the most sympathetic writers admit that some Indian courts administer little more that rural justice. 75 The undeveloped nature of many Indian courts has been noted by commentators on the American Indian tribal judiciary. For example, Indian judges are often held in relatively low status, and very few have legal training. 7 6 In most cases, tribal appellate systems are generally poor; in some courts, no appeal is available.
7 7 Further, a recent survey of attorneys in states with large Indian populations found that a majority of attorneys had a low opinion of tribal courtsY. 7 In 1967, a Senate subcommittee reached a similar conclusion in a report submitted to the Congressional Record. The subcommittee cited a survey of 2000 questionnaires given to a broadly representative group of persons familiar with Indian affairs. The questions dealt with the lack of constitutional protections for defendants in tribal courts. 79 The results of the investigation showed that substantive and political rights were denied "not from malice or ill will ... but from the tribal judges' inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the traditions and forms of the American legal system." 80 In contrast to some Indian courts that may offer little more than self-help solutions to disputes, 8 ' other Indian tribes have highly developed legal systems. Perhaps the most notable is the Navajo Nation. The Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation is organized at the trial level into five family courts and seven district courts with three circuit judges. All of these courts have the right of appeal to a three-member Navajo Supreme Court. cases, 899 family court cases, and a total of 721 children cases. 83 The actual expenditures of the Navajo judiciary for the 1990 fiscal year were over $700,000. The expenses varied from salaries to office supplies, jury and witness fees, and education and training programs. 84 The policies that control the Navajo justice system are at once historical and progressive. As stated by Chief Justice Tom Tso, "We have confronted different peoples and ways, and have endured by adapting the new in such a way that it becomes Navajo." 85 Evidence of the dynamic and powerful role of the Navajo judiciary is the recent decision by the Navajo Tribal Council to grant the Navajo Supreme Court full authority to rule on the legitimacy of Navajo legislative and executive acts. 8 6 Judicial review was the final result of an eleven-year struggle between the branches of the Navajo tribe. The Council decided that if the Navajo Nation "is to move forward toward the reality of a three-branch form of government [,] the Navajo Supreme Court must be the final law on Indian land." 8 1 7
C. Non-Indian Minor Crime on Indian Land
The competing forces of constitutional theory and the irregular development of Indian tribal judicial systems must also be viewed in the context of minor crimes on Indian land. The Court in Oliphant noted the "prevalence of non-Indian crime on today's reservations." S Similarly, the problem of non-Indian crime has been noted in congressional testimony, court opinions, and newspaper accounts, and is illustrated by the facts of Oliphant itself.
In congressional hearings on reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Colville and Makah Indian tribal representatives from the state of Washington testified concerning the problem on non-Indian crime. The Indians spoke of "the willful disobedience of tribal hunting and fishing laws," 9 and noted that "speeding, reckless driving, and automobile accidents [were] increasing at an alarming rate." 9 The chairman of the Makah Tribe testified that law enforcement had ceased on the reservation because the county sheriff was based seventy miles from 93 The federal prosecutors' hesitation is attributed to crowded dockets, the long distances that witnesses and officers must travel, and cases that likely will result in a small fines or suspended sentences. In a newspaper interview, the United States Attorney of Butte, Montana, agreed with that opinion. He said that denying tribal jurisdiction created a "vacuum" of law enforcement on the reservation because neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor his office could handle the caseload of non-Indian crimes committed on Indian reservations.
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The facts of Oliphant are an additional illustration of the problem of non-Indian crime on tribal land. In August 1973, on the Madison Indian Reservation, thousands of people were expected for the Chief Seattle Days celebration. To control the expected influx, tribal authorities requested law enforcement assistance from the local county and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).9 For the entire weekend, the county provided one deputy for eight hours of service. 98 The BIA declined all help and responded that the Indians "would have to provide their own law enforcement out of tribal funds and with tribal personnel."
99 Subsequently, tribal police arrested Oliphant at 4:30 a.m. on August 19 and later charged him with "assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest.
' ' l°° The same night, Belgarde, after a high-speed race that ended only when he collided with a tribal police vehicle, was arrested and charged with tribal criminal violations.' 0 ' The dilemma of tribes with no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian minor crimes is summarized in the Ninth Circuit decision, which was overturned by the Supreme Court in Oliphant. history of subordination toward the American Indian, however, is inextricably mixed with these principles. Allowing tribal court jurisdicl|ion with de novo review for minor crimes on Indian land would, in part, reverse the history of subordination of American Indians. At the same time, there would be no compromise of United States constitutional protection and no additional burden on tribes that do not choose to assert jurisdiction over non-Indian minor crime. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Oliphant,1 2 1 without tribal control of nonIndian minor crimes, traffic offenses, trespasses, hunting and fishing violations, larcenies, and simple assaults often go unpunished. If Indian justice systems have the power to prosecute these offenses, the only limit on the prosecutors and courts will be the tribe's political and judicial resources.
A. corollary to allowing de novo review is that tribes will not be required to prosecute non-Indian minor crimes if they do not so choose to do so. Some tribes are concerned that de novo review would "impose unmanageable financial burdens on tribal governments.
1 2 2 However, with de novo review Indian tribes would be able to deal with this problem in the way that is best suited to their needs and resources. Tribes could consent to state jurisdiction pursuant to section 1321(b) of the Indian Civil Rights Act '2 and be free of all responsibility for non-Indian crime. Alternatively, the tribes could assume jurisdiction and seek to control minor crimes on Indian land subject to a second trial in state or federal court. Because a non-Indian defendant will have the right to a second trial in a state or federal court with no prejudice to either party, 2 4 the protections of the federal constitution will not be sacrificed. As suggested by Senator Ervin, the second trial would determine if "the appellant was deprived of any right or privilege conferred on him by the Constitution." 12 In addition to that protection, a non-Indian would have the opportunity in every case to have his guilt determined by the courts and the laws of the United States.
If we believe that justice cannot be served on minor crimes in American Indian courts with a system of de novo review, we are irrationally continuing the historic subordination and racial categorization of Indian tribes. With de novo review, Indian tribes can be given the opportunity to deal directly and efficiently with minor crime on Indian land, and non-Indian defendants will receive all the protections of federal and state constitutions.
NOTES D. De Novo Review: A Solution to Undeveloped Tribal Justice Systems
The problems often noted with the Indian justice systems, such as disregard for written court rules and tribal politics influencing judicial decisions, 26 may at least partially be alleviated by a system of de novo review. The curative effect of de novo review was noted by the Supreme Court in Ludwig. It reasoned that it is possible for the first proceeding to be unfair. However, the defendant may protect himself by insisting on a new trial. 27 In a similar proposal for de novo review made during hearings concerning Legislation to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, 28 Senator Ervin noted during hearings that a new trial would be in the same manner and under the same rules as if the criminal action had been in the United States district court. 1 
29
As a consequence, the non-Indian defendant would receive all the protections offered by the state or federal constitutions.
Even though the defendant would be protected by state and federal constitutions, Indian courts would be allowed either to retain their tribal form of justice or adapt to more rigorous judicial standards. In Ludwig v. Massachusetts, the court discussed the indirect effect of a second jury trial on the initial proceeding. Justice Blackmun stated that "the right to a [new] jury trial very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less likely."' 3 This ancillary effect of de novo review was noted by Senator Ervin, who claimed that "[s]uch an appeal would not only protect the rights of those convicted by tribal courts, but would improve the quality of justice rendered by tribal courts."''
E. Decreased Problems of Non-Indian Minor Crimes
In addition to encouraging improvements in tribal courts, de novo review will help relieve the unmanageable burdens placed on federal or state authorities in controlling non-Indian minor crime on Indian land. For example, if a non-Indian defendant is tried in a tribal court, the possibility of a new trial at the state or federal level may be unnecessary or unattractive. If the accused is found not guilty, the issue will be closed and there will be no need for a federal or state proceeding. In the alternative, if the defendant is convicted, the possibility of a new trial may be an unattractive option for two reasons.
